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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) and (j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs claims, filed 26 years 
after her claimed loss, are barred by applicable statutes of limitation. 
This is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 
P.2d 1125,1128 (Utah 1992). This issue was raised and decided in defendants' favor in the 
district court. (R. 137, 211, 370.) 
2. Whether the summary judgment may be affirmed on the alternative grounds of laches 
or failure to state a claim for recovery of damages for emotional distress. 
This is a question of law for the appellate court. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 
(Utah 1995) (appellate court may affirm on any proper ground, even though different from that 
relied upon by the district court). These alternative grounds for summary judgment were 
presented to the district court. (R. 223-31.) 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to file a 
second amended complaint when no new facts or claims were alleged. 
Permission to file an amended pleading is discretionary with the district court, and the 
court's ruling denying an amendment is reviewed not for correctness, as plaintiff asserts, but for 
abuse of discretion. Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah App. 1993). 
This issue was raised and decided in defendants' favor in the district court. (R. 140-97, 244.) 
4. On the cross-appeal, whether the district court improperly refused to strike the Carling 
Affidavit, obtained through inappropriate ex parte contact of plaintiff s counsel with defendant 
Carling. 
This issue, involving interpretation of the rules of professional conduct, is reviewed for 
correctness as a matter of law. Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). This 
issue was raised and decided in the district court. (R. 313-18, 370.) 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
The statutes of limitation that govern disposition of this appeal are U.C.A. §§ 78-12-25(3) 
(torts) and 78-12-23(2) (written contract), set forth verbatim in the Addendum. (Add. 10-11.) 
The cross-appeal, pertaining to plaintiffs counsel's ex parte acquisition of an affidavit from 
defendant Carling, is governed by Rule 4.2, Utah R. Prof. Conduct, set forth verbatim in the 
Addendum. (Add. 12-13.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for emotional distress damages arising out of plaintiff s relinquishment 
of a newborn child for adoption in 1967, now 30 years ago. Plaintiffs amended complaint 
alleges various tort and contract theories all based on the common claim that plaintiff was 
incapacitated by medication at the time she signed the adoption consent. (R. 113.) Defendants 
moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs cause of action is barred by statutes of 
limitation, having accrued in 1967, when plaintiff realized that she had relinquished her child for 
adoption against her will. (R. 199,211-16.) Defendants also demonstrated that plaintiff s claims 
are barred by laches, and that plaintiff is entitled to no relief in any event because damages for 
emotional distress are not recoverable. (R. 223-31.) The district court granted summary 
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judgment on the basis that plaintiffs claims are barred by statutes of limitation. (R. 369.) 
Plaintiff filed this appeal on the limitations ruling (R. 374), and defendants cross-appeal the 
denial of relief for plaintiffs counsel's ex parte contact with defendant Carling (R. 381). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Most of the facts set forth in plaintiffs statement of facts to this Court pertain to the 
underlying merits of her claims, which the district court did not reach, and are therefore 
immaterial to the legal issues presented on this appeal. Following are the undisputed facts 
material to this appeal. 
In 1967, plaintiff was a 23-year-old unmarried college graduate student. (Amended 
Complaint, If 9, R. 114.) By plaintiffs own account, she was "well educated and articulate." 
(App. Br. 45.) When she became pregnant, she contacted the predecessor of LDS Social 
Services ("Agency") to discuss placing the expected child for adoption. Plaintiff met several 
times with Agency social worker Gladys Carling to discuss and plan the adoption prior to the 
birth. When the time for delivery arrived, plaintiff was admitted to the hospital under an alias, 
and the Agency was designated to pay her medical expenses, all with the understanding that 
plaintiff would carry out her plan to relinquish the child for adoption. (Amended Complaint, | 
11, R. 114; Defendants9 Affidavit of Gladys S. Carling, f 9, R. 326, hereafter "Second Carling 
Afft.") 
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On January 145 1967, plaintiff gave birth to a son at St. Benedict's Hospital ("Hospital") 
in Ogden, Utah. Following the delivery, the Hospital administered plaintiff a sedative called 
Thorazine, as directed by her physician. (Amended Complaint, ffi[ 17-18, R. 115.)1 
On January 16, 1967, two days following the birth, Carling went to the Hospital for the 
purpose of obtaining plaintiffs release for the adoption. Plaintiff signed a written "Release," 
relinquishing her child to the Agency and consenting to the child's adoption. By signing the 
Release, plaintiff affirmed that she had "carefully read" the document, understood its contents, 
and was signing freely and voluntarily. Plaintiff also had the presence of mind to add her own 
handwritten addendum that if the adoptive parents were unable to perform their responsibilities, 
the child should be returned to her. Carling believed that plaintiff had the mental capacity to 
understand what she was doing, and that plaintiff did knowingly and voluntarily sign the 
Release. The Agency thereafter placed the child for adoption. (Amended Complaint, Tffi 20-21, 
R. 115-16; Release, R. 124-26, Add. 7; Def. Carling Aff t, ffl[ 9-10, R. 326.) 
On January 18, 1967, plaintiff visited the Agency and expressed her sorrow and regret 
over the loss of her son. Plaintiff inquired regarding the adoption, presumably to revoke her 
consent, but was informed that she could not do so. Plaintiff claims to have made approximately 
Thorazine is the trade name for chlorpromazine, which is used as a sedative or pain medication. Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary 1227 (10th ed. 1993). Plaintiff claims she was "incapacitated" by the medication (App. Br. 10), 
but there is no medical evidence in the record to support that conclusion. Sedation is not equated with incapacity, and 
the taking of pain medication, such as Thorazine, in connection with child birth does not necessarily impair judgment 
and vitiate adoption consent. See, e.g., Faulkenberry v. Elkins, 445 S.E.2d 283 (Ga. App. 1994) (upholding mother's 
mental capacity to consent to adoption despite taking "a quadruple dose of her thorazine medication" two hours before 
signing the consent); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 530 P.2d 896, 898 (Ariz. App. 1975) (upheld adoption consent of 
mature woman who signed after taking pain medication). In any event, as demonstrated below, the actual effect of 
the medication is immaterial because plaintiff admittedly knew of her injury, i.e., the loss of her child, after her 
medication wore off and she left the Hospital without her child. 
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thirty more such inquiries of the Agency, but was denied relief. (Plaintiffs Affidavit, fflf 26-28, 
R.29L) 
In 1990, twenty-three years after the relinquishment, plaintiff and her son were reunited. 
On or about May 29,1990, plaintiff requested her son's medical records from the Hospital, and 
the Hospital gave plaintiff a copy of her own medical records, showing the administration of 
Thorazine. (Amended Complaint, ffif 28-31, R. 116-17.) 
Plaintiff commenced this action on May 20, 1993, alleging that she has felt the pain of 
the loss of her child every day since the relinquishment in 1967. (Original Complaint, Tf 25, R. 
5.) Plaintiff claims negligence, constructive fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and breach of contract in taking her adoption consent while she was allegedly incapacitated by 
medication. (Amended Complaint, R. 113.) 
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs cause of 
action accrued in 1967, and that her action is therefore barred by applicable statutes of limitation. 
Defendants demonstrated that the discovery rule has no application to the case because, among 
other reasons, plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of a cause of action many years 
before she commenced this action. Defendants also presented alternative grounds for summary 
judgment, such as laches and nonrecoverabiUty of damages for emotional distress. (R. 199-241.) 
Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that her cause of action did not accrue until August 1990, 
after she had procured a copy of her medical record showing that she had been administered 
Thorazine in the Hospital. Plaintiff produced an affidavit from Gladys Carling, obtained ex parte 
by plaintiffs counsel, stating that plaintiff was "sedated" when she signed the Release. ("First 
Carling affidavit," R. 308.) Defendants objected to the Carling affidavit and requested that it be 
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stricken on the grounds that Carling is a represented adverse party, and that plaintiffs counsel's 
ex parte contact violated rules of professional conduct. (R. 311-33). 
The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that 
plaintiffs action is barred by applicable statutes of limitation. The court reasoned that plaintiffs 
cause of action accrued in 1967 when she realized that her child had been taken by the Agency, 
allegedly against her will. The court held that the discovery rule did not apply because plaintiff 
had inquiry notice and failed to take reasonable steps to discover her alleged incapacity. 
However, the court refused to rule on the challenged affidavit and counsel's conduct in procuring 
it, considering the issue moot. (R. 370, Add. 1-2.) This appeal and cross-appeal followed. (R. 
374,381.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This action is barred by tort and contract statutes of limitation. Plaintiffs cause of action 
is for the alleged taking of her adoption consent against her will. Her injury is the loss of her son. 
Her alleged incapacity is not an injury, but a legal theory on which to invalidate her adoption 
consent. Plaintiffs cause of action accrued in 1967, upon the signing of her adoption consent, 
regardless of her ignorance of her alleged incapacity. In 1967, plaintiff knew of her claimed 
injury; she knew who had taken her child; and she had the legal theory of duress upon which to 
base her cause of action for return of the child. Yet plaintiff took no legal action until 1993,26 
years later. The statutes of limitation expired, at the latest, in 1973, 20 years before this action 
was filed. Therefore, this action is barred, and the summary judgment should be affirmed. 
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The discovery rule does not apply to toll the statutes of limitation until 1990, when 
plaintiff allegedly discovered her incapacity. The discovery rule does not apply because plaintiff 
cannot satisfy the threshold showing that she did not know and reasonably could not have known 
of any cause of action prior to expiration of the limitations period. Plaintiff plainly did know of 
her cause of action based on duress in 1967. Again, she knew her child had allegedly been taken 
against her will; she knew who had taken the child; and she had the legal basis of duress to regain 
the child. Therefore, the limitations period is not tolled until plaintiff discovered the alternative 
legal theory of incapacity in 1990. In addition, the discovery rule is inapplicable because 
plaintiff reasonably could have discovered her incapacity prior to the limitations bar. If her child 
was taken against her will, she had a duty of reasonable inquiry, which should have included 
obtaining her medical records in 1967, just as she did in 1990. 
Even if plaintiff could satisfy the prerequisites for the discovery rule, none of the three 
versions of that rule applies in this case. The statutory discovery rule in the Health Care 
Malpractice Act does not apply because the district court ruled the Act's statute of limitations 
inapplicable, and plaintiff did not appeal that ruling. The concealment version does not apply 
because plaintiff reasonably could have discovered her alleged incapacity. Finally, the 
exceptional circumstances version cannot apply because the limitations bar became a vested right 
in 1973, long before this version of the discovery rule was adopted, in 1981. In any event, this 
third version does not apply because greater injustice would result from permitting the claim than 
from barring it. Therefore, the limitations period is not tolled by the discovery rule. 
The summary judgment may also be affirmed on the alternative grounds of laches and 
failure to state a claim for recovery of damages for emotional distress. The action is barred by 
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laches because plaintiffs delay in filing the action is unreasonable, and defendants are prejudiced 
by the resulting loss of evidence to defend the claim. Regarding damages, plaintiff seeks 
recovery only for her emotional distress. However, Utah law precludes recovery of damages for 
purely emotional distress under her alleged theories of negligence, constructive fraud, and breach 
of contract. Moreover, plaintiff cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
because the taking of plaintiff s adoption consent, at her request, for the socially desirable 
purpose of providing a home for her child, is not "outrageous conduct." Because plaintiff cannot 
obtain her requested relief, defendants are entitled to judgment. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to file a second 
amended complaint. The proposed amendment merely added the names of other Church entities 
that had nothing to do with the relinquishment. The amendment raised no new facts, claims, or 
issues, and added nothing of substance to the case. Moreover, the amendment would not have 
altered the court's ruling. Therefore, the amendment was properly denied as a futile act. 
On the cross-appeal, plaintiffs counsel violated rules of professional conduct in meeting 
ex parte with defendant Carling for the purpose of obtaining her affidavit. The issue is not moot, 
and even if it were, this Court should still review the matter because it involves an issue of 
importance to the public and the bar, the conduct is likely to recur if not corrected, and the issue 
is capable of evading judicial review. Rule 4.2 bars the contact with Carling on the grounds that 
she is a party defendant and, as a former employee of the defendant Agency, her conduct is the 
subject of the litigation and is imputed to the Agency. The appropriate remedy is to strike the 
affidavit obtained by plaintiffs counsel and to award defendants the costs and attorney fees 
incurred in obtaining relief. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: PLAINTIFF'S ACTION, FILED 26 YEARS AFTER HER CLAIMED 
LOSS, IS BARRED BY APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
A. The Action Is Barred By Tort and Contract Statutes of Limitation, 
The purpose of statutes of limitation is "to promote justice by preventing surprises 
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, 
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Becton Dickinson and Co. v. Reese, 668 
P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983). The statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action 
accrues. U.C.A. § 78-12-1. The general rule is that a cause of action accrues upon the 
occurrence of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action. Moreover, Utah law is 
clear that "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent the running of 
the statute of limitations." Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981); see also Retherford 
v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 1992); Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc., 920 P.2d 575 (Utah App. 1996). 
This action is governed by both tort and contract statutes of limitation. Plaintiffs cause 
of action is for the alleged wrongful taking of her adoption consent. She asserts four different 
legal theories for relief: negligence, constructive fraud, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and breach of contract. A cause of action that is pleaded in both tort and contract is 
governed by the limitations period applicable to each theory. See Ward v. Intermountain 
Farmers Ass 'n, 907 P.2d 264, 267 n.2 (Utah 1995). Accordingly, the three tort claims are 
governed by U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3), which bars after four years "[a]n action for relief not 
otherwise provided for by law." See, e.g., O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 
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1141 (Utah 1991); Retherford, supra, 844 P.2d at 975-77, The contract claim is governed by 
section 78-12-23(2), which bars after six years "[a]n action upon any contract, obligation, or 
liability founded upon an instrument in writing." See Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182 
(Utah App. 1987). While two different limitation periods apply, both periods began to run at the 
same time, upon accrual of the cause of action. See Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Utah 
1996) (a cause of action cannot be split for limitation purposes; "once some harm is manifest, the 
limitations period begins to run on all claims"). The tort claims accrued when the elements of 
each claim came into existence. Retherford, supra, at 975. The contract claim accrued upon 
breach of the contract. Koulis, supra, at 1186. All claims accrued at the same time, upon accrual 
of the underlying cause of action. 
Plaintiffs cause of action accrued in 1967, and is therefore barred by both statutes of 
limitation. All four of plaintiff s legal theories are based on the allegation that she was 
incapacitated by medication at the time she signed the consent. Accordingly, the alleged tortious 
act for all three torts, as well as the alleged breach of contract, was the single act of taking 
plaintiffs adoption consent. That challenged act occurred on January 16, 1967; therefore, 
plaintiffs cause of action accrued on that day, 30 years ago. On that day, plaintiffs claimed 
injury, the loss of her son, occurred, and plaintiff knew that her child was being placed for 
adoption by the Agency. Therefore, all elements of the cause of action were present: she had an 
injuiy, a defendant, and legal theories for relief Furthermore, as noted above, plaintiffs claimed 
ignorance of her cause of action, resulting from her unawareness of her alleged incapacity, does 
not prevent the running of the statutes of limitation. See, e.g., Myers v. McDonald, supra, at 86. 
Therefore, plaintiffs cause of action was barred at least by 1973, twenty years before this action 
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was filed. See Dow v. Gilroy, 910 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah App. 1996) (holding that four-year 
catch-all statute of limitations barred paternity action filed by adult child more than twenty years 
after learning the identity of her father). 
B. The Discovery Rule Does Not Apply To Toll The Statutes of Limitation. 
Plaintiff argues that her action is not barred because the discovery rule operated to toll the 
statutes of limitation until 1990, when she supposedly discovered that she lacked capacity to sign 
the consent due to the Thorazine. Only then, she asserts, did she know of her "legal injury" and 
have a cause of action. (App. Br. 27-30.) However, the discovery rule has no application to this 
case. 
The discovery rule is an exception to the general rule, stated above, that limitation periods 
commence upon accrual of the cause of action, regardless of ignorance of the cause of action. 
Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until discovery of facts 
forming the basis of the cause of action. E.g., Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 
1229, 1231 (Utah 1995); O'Nealv. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Utah 
1991). Whether the discovery rule applies is a question of law. Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 
868, 869 (Utah 1990). The discovery rule may apply under three circumstances: (1) when 
mandated by statute; (2) when the cause of action has been concealed by the defendant; and (3) 
when the case presents exceptional circumstances that make application of the statute of 
limitations irrational or unjust. Walker Drug, supra, at 1231; Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 
P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992). None of these circumstances exists in this case. In any event, 
plaintiff cannot establish the threshold requirement for any application of the discovery rule--a 
II 
showing that she did not know and reasonably could not have known of any possible cause of 
action before the limitations period expired. 
1. Threshold Showing of No Cause of Action. Case law is clear that in order to invoke 
any version of the discovery rule, plaintiff must first show that she did not know and reasonably 
could not have known of any cause of action prior to the limitations bar. Failure to comply with 
this threshold requirement can be established as a matter of law. E.g., Walker Drug, supra, 902 
P.2d at 1231 (affirming summary judgment as to exceptional circumstances and concealment 
versions of the discovery rule); Atwoodv. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 823 P.2d 1064, 1065 (Utah 1992) 
(affirming summary judgment as to discovery argument based on medical malpractice statute). 
Plaintiff has failed to make this threshold showing. 
Plaintiff had a cause of action for revocation of her adoption consent, based on duress, 
from the day she signed the consent in January 1967. The essence of plaintiff s case is that the 
Agency allegedly took plaintiffs baby for adoption against her will. In January 1967, plaintiff 
knew of her injury, the loss of her child; she knew that the Agency had taken the child for 
adoptive placement; and, based on her multiple inquiries and requests for return of the child, she 
obviously believed that the child had been taken against her will. (If the child was not taken 
against her will, then plaintiff has no injury and no claim.) Given these facts, indisputably known 
to plaintiff in January 1967, she had a cause of action for revocation of her consent based on 
duress from that time forward. See, e.g., DP v. Social Service and Child Welfare Dept., 19 Utah 
2d 311,431 P.2d 547 (1967) (unwed mother's adoption consent revoked based on duress and 
incapacity). Accordingly, plaintiffs claimed ignorance of her incapacity theory in 1967 does not 
prevent the accrual of her cause of action based on the alternative theory of duress. As observed 
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in Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah App. 1996), "The limitations 
period is postponed only by belated discovery of key facts and not by delayed discovery of legal 
theories." (Emp. added.) See O'Neal, supra, 821 P.2d at 1144-45 (refusing to apply discovery 
rule in sex abuse case because, while the plaintiff was psychologically unable to reveal the abuse 
earlier, he did know of the abuse and the perpetrator within the limitations period); Pritzlaffv. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 786 (Wis. 1995) (barring claim for illicit sexual 
relationship filed 27 years after the relationship ended; discovery rule did not apply because, 
while the plaintiff may not have known of her claim for emotional distress when the relationship 
ended, she did know the facts supporting a claim for civil battery, and her cause of action 
therefore accrued from that date). 
Not only did plaintiff know the facts supporting a duress claim, the record also shows that 
she reasonably should have discovered her alleged incapacity claim before the limitations period 
expired. The two relevant considerations are (1) whether plaintiff was on inquiry notice; and (2) 
whether she exercised due diligence. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, supra, 920 P.2d at 579. 
The test for inquiry notice is whether the circumstances would suggest to a person of ordinary 
intelligence that a loss, injury or wrong had occurred. If so, the plaintiff must be reasonably 
diligent in investigating the facts surrounding the loss which forms the basis of her cause of 
action. Id. In this case, plaintiff admits that she knew of her loss from the beginning and 
repeatedly inquired of the Agency regarding that loss. Her admission of "over thirty" inquiries to 
the Agency belies her claim of having "no suspicion of wrongdoing." (App. Br. 30.) See Hove v. 
McMaster, 621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980) (plaintiffs repeated complaints to several doctors over two 
years established her knowledge of a possible claim). If the relinquishment was truly 
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involuntary, plaintiff had a duty to inquire how her consent could have been obtained against her 
will. Those inquiries reasonably should have included requests for copies of her medical records 
from the Hospital, not simply inquiries regarding payment of the bill, which she knew had been 
paid by the Agency. If plaintiff had requested her medical record in 1967, she would have 
received it, as demonstrated by the ease with which she acquired the record in 1990. If plaintiff 
had been dissatisfied with the responses to her inquiries, judicial processes could have been 
invoked to assist her. These facts show, as a matter of law, that plaintiff did not exercise 
reasonable diligence to discover her alleged incapacity prior to expiration of the limitations 
period. Therefore, she is charged with knowledge of what a reasonable inquiry would have 
disclosed, and she is precluded from invoking the discovery rule. Anderson, supra, at 579-80; 
Walker Drug, supra, 902 P.2d at 1323; Warren, supra, 838 P.2d at 1129.2 
In summary, because plaintiff had actual knowledge of the facts supporting a claim for 
duress, and she reasonably could have discovered the facts supporting her claim for incapacity, 
The district court correctly ruled that plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence to discover her alleged 
incapacity: 
All of the affidavits and documentation in the file indicates that Miss Safsten knew . . . that 
there was not a day that passed that Plaintiff has not felt deep heartache and void for the loss of her 
child. 
She—the act that damaged her was the consent document. The doctor prescribed the 
Thorazine. The nurse, probably, at St. Benedict's probably administered it. And that was a readily 
discoverable fact. If it wasn't voluntarily surrendered by the execution of a consent, certainly a 
subpoena would have provided that information very quickly. 
The Court finds, as a matter of law from the facts stated herein, that she knew that she was 
injured once she had her full faculties following the birth of the child; that she didn't take steps to 
reasonably discover what, if any, the cause of any incapacity was. 
The Court finds that, by any applicable statute of limitations, the case on all causes of action 
is time-barred [Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing, R. 390-91.] 
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plaintiff is precluded from invoking the discovery rule to toll the statutes of limitation. In any 
event, as demonstrated below, none of the three versions of the discovery rule could apply in this 
case. 
2. Statutory Discovery Rule. Plaintiff does not expressly cite any statute mandating 
application of the discovery rule, but she relies on medical malpractice cases that are based on 
the discovery rule in U.C.A. § 78-14-4(1), Health Care Malpractice Act. For example, plaintiff 
cites Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), and Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 
784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989), for the proposition that her cause of action did not accrue until 
discovery of her "legal injury," defined in Foil as "discovery of injury and the negligence which 
resulted in the injury." 601 P.2d at 148. Plaintiff extrapolates that interpretation of the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations to require discovery of both her injury (the loss of her son) and 
its supposed cause (her alleged incapacity). (App. Br. 27-29.) However, as the district court 
ruled, the medical malpractice statute of limitations does not apply in this case. (R. 370, Add. 2.) 
Therefore, neither can the notion of "legal injury," derived from that statute, apply in this case. 
Plaintiff cannot be permitted to escape the limitations and repose provisions of that statute, while 
invoking its discovery provision. See Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., supra, 823 P.2d at 1065 
(rejecting application of the medical malpractice case law and discovery rule to avoid the bar of a 
products liability statute of limitations).3 
3. Alleged Concealment. Plaintiff argues that the discovery rule should apply because 
the Agency concealed the fact of her incapacity. Plaintiff relies exclusively on the affidavit of 
Defendants have chosen to abandon that portion of their cross-appeal challenging the district court's ruling that 
the medical malpractice statutes of limitation and repose do not apply. (Order, R. 370, Add. 2, K 1; Notice of Cross-
Appeal, R. 381.) 
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defendant social worker Gladys Carling, which states that plaintiff appeared "sedated" when she 
signed the adoption consent. (R. 308; App. Br. 36-37.) However, as noted previously, sedation 
is not the equivalent of incapacity; plaintiff has provided absolutely no medical evidence that she 
was incapacitated. Even Gladys Carling, in her second affidavit, affirms her belief that plaintiff 
had sufficient mental capacity to know what she was doing. (R. 326.) Absent medical proof of 
incapacity, plaintiff cannot establish that the Agency concealed her incapacity. Furthermore, as 
demonstrated in Point IV, below, the first Carling affidavit should be stricken as a sanction for 
plaintiffs counsel's improper ex parte interview with Carling. 
In any event, even if plaintiff could establish her incapacity, in order to invoke the 
concealment prong of the discovery rule plaintiff must show that she could not reasonably have 
discovered the fact concealed. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., supra, 920 P.2d at 579. 
As demonstrated in argument B.l., above, the plaintiffs perception that her child had been taken 
against her will imposed upon her a duty to inquire regarding the circumstances of her 
relinquishment. As a matter of law, plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence to discover the 
facts surrounding her relinquishment, including her alleged incapacity. She did not ask the 
Hospital for her medical records; she did not discuss the matter with her physician; she did not 
ask the Agency if she was incapacitated when she signed the consent; and she has not alleged 
that she ever expressly requested the return of her child. Plaintiff maintains only that she 
"diligently inquired" of the Agency, in general terms, "regarding the adoption and her son." 
(App. Br. 37.) The Agency responded, as it was legally required to do, that it could not reveal 
the confidential information surrounding the adoption. In short, the information plaintiff claims 
the Agency concealed, the same information plaintiff claims she discovered in 1990, was 
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available to plaintiff in 1967. Therefore, plaintiff cannot invoke the concealment prong of the 
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations. Anderson, supra, at 580; Warren v. Provo City, 
supra^ 838 P.2d at 1129-30 (rejecting concealment claim because the plaintiff could cite no 
affirmative representation on which he relied, and he failed to take reasonable steps to pursue his 
claim); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987) (fraud claim arising from 
gas station lease was barred by statute of limitations because the plaintiff could have discovered 
the basis for her claim 14 years earlier by merely requesting a copy of the lease). 
4. Exceptional CircumstanceSo This third version of the discovery rule allows tolling 
of the statute of limitations if the case presents "exceptional circumstances" that render 
application of the limitations bar "irrational or unjust." The hardship of the limitations bar on the 
plaintiff is weighed against the prejudice to the defendant from the difficulties of proof caused by 
the passage of time. O'Neal supra, 821 P.2d at 1143; Myers v. McDonald, supra, 635 P.2d at 
87. This balancing test is a question of law. Klinger v. Kightly, supra, 791 P.2d at 872. 
However, the rule has no application in this case for two reasons. 
First, the exceptional circumstances discovery rule cannot be applied in this case because 
the rule was adopted after plaintiff's cause of action was already barred. This form of the 
discovery rule was judicially created by the Utah Supreme Court in Myers v. McDonald, supra, 
in 1981. See O'Neal, supra, 821 P.2d at 1143. However, plaintiffs cause of action, having 
accrued in 1967, was time-barred at least by 1973, long before Myers was decided. When the 
limitations period expired in 1973, defendants acquired a vested right to invoke the statute of 
limitations defense to bar the action. Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058,1062 (Utah 1995). 
Because the statute of limitations defense becomes a vested right as of the time the limitations 
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period expires, no subsequent change in the statute or its judicial application can operate 
retroactively to revive a previously barred claim. Id. at 1062-63; In re Swan 's Estate, 79 P.2d 
999,1002 (Utah 1938). Accordingly, this Court is precluded, as a matter of law, from applying 
the exceptional circumstances discovery rule to revive plaintiffs previously barred cause of 
action. 
Second, even if the balancing test is applied, the prejudice to defendants outweighs any 
injustice to plaintiff. Refusal to apply the limitations bar would cause terrible prejudice to 
defendants resulting from difficulties of proof caused by the long passage of time. Over the past 
30 years, records have been lost or discarded, and witnesses have died, moved, or forgotten the 
events at issue. Plaintiff claims that no documents and records have been lost or destroyed (App. 
Br. 35), but plaintiff has produced no such documents for the record. Moreover, the Court can 
take judicial notice that after 30 years, the memory of any living witness, such as plaintiffs 
physician, nurse, and family members, will have significantly faded. As a consequence, 
defendants would have difficulty disproving plaintiffs claim of incapacity. On the other hand, 
the facts reveal no injustice to plaintiff in applying the limitations bar. From the beginning in 
1967, plaintiff knew of her loss, knew who to sue, and had a legal cause of action to obtain relief; 
yet, she failed to file this action until 1993,26 years later. Plaintiffs delay is simply 
inexcusable, and she should not be permitted to invoke an equitable remedy to pursue her claim. 
This is precisely the type of case for which statutes of limitation are intended, and greater 
injustice would result from permitting the claim than from barring it. See, e.g., Pritzlaffv. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, supra, 533 N.W.2d at 788 ("sound public policy requires that the 
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discovery rule should not save a claim" for emotional injuries filed 27 years after accrual; the 
long passage of time increases the potential for fraudulent claims that are difficult to defend). 
In summary, plaintiffs cause of action accrued in 1967 and was barred, at the latest, in 
1973, regardless of her ignorance of claimed incapacity. The discovery rule does not apply 
because plaintiff knew of the facts for a cause of action based on duress in 1967, and she 
reasonably should have discovered her alternative claim based on incapacity. In any event, none 
of the three versions of the discovery rule applies in this case. Therefore, the limitations period 
was not tolled, and her cause of action is barred.4 
POINT 11 THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY BE AFFIRMED ON THE 
ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS OF LACHES AND FAILURE TO STATE A 
CLAIM FOR RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS. 
The law is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the lower court judgment on 
any proper ground, even though different from that relied upon by the lower court. E.g., DeBry 
v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995). In the district court, in addition to the statute of 
Plaintiff argues that summary judgment is precluded by material issues of fact relating primarily to the 
discoverability of her incapacity. (App. Br. 40-42.) However, as demonstrated above, the reasonableness of plaintiff s 
inquiries regarding her claimed incapacity is relevant only to the threshold and concealment elements of the discovery 
rule. Regardless of plaintiffs incapacity claim, her cause of action is barred, and the discovery rule is inapplicable, 
because plaintiff indisputably knew of facts supporting a cause of action based on duress. This threshold determination 
of a known cause of action, is made as a matter of law. See, e.g., Walker Drug Co. v.LaSal Oil Co., supra, 902 P.2d 
at 1231 (affirming summary judgment); Atwoodv. Sturm, Ruger & Co., supra, 823 P.2d at 1065 (affirming summary 
judgment). Even the concealment version of the discovery rule can be decided as a matter of law. See, e.g., Warren 
v. Provo City, supra, 838 P.2d at 1129-30 (affirming summary judgment); Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, supra, 
920 P.2d at 579 (affirming summary judgment). Accordingly, discoverability of plaintiff s claimed incapacity need not 
even be reached under the threshold analysis and may be decided as a matter of law under the concealment analysis. 
Plaintiff also argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because the district court supposedly decided 
the merits of plaintiffs incapacity claim. (App. Br. 43-45.) However, nothing in the court's order supports this 
assertion. Whether plaintiff was in fact incapacitated when she signed the consent is not material to the statute of 
limitations defense and was not decided by the district court. The limitations defense was properly decided as a matter 
of law, as it has been in the cited cases. 
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limitations defense, defendants argued that they are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of 
laches and failure to state a claim for recovery of emotional distress damages. (R. 223-29.) 
While the district court based its ruling on the statutes of limitation, this Court may affirm on 
either of these alternative grounds, if necessary. 
A. This Action Is Barred By the Equitable Defense of Laches. 
The equitable doctrine of laches may apply in lieu of a statute of limitations. As set forth 
in Nilson-Newey & Co. v. Utah Resources International, 905 P.2d 312, 314 (Utah App. 1995): 
Laches is an equitable doctrine "based on the maxim that 'equity aids the 
vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.'" [Citation omitted.] "The doctrine 
of laches may apply in equity, whether or not a statute of limitations also applies 
and whether or not an applicable statute of limitation has been satisfied." [Quoting 
American Tierra v. City ofW. Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 763 (Utah 1992).] 
To establish laches, the defendant must show that (1) the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in 
bringing the action; and (2) the defendant is prejudiced by that delay. Nilson-Newey, supra, at 
314 (barring action for accounting of real estate venture filed 35 years after venture began 
because the plaintiff had long known that the property had been developed without distribution 
of profits). See also Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259, 261 n.4 (Utah App. 1992) (barring action 
of mother to set aside adoption decree filed three years after decree); Borland v. Chandler, 733 
P.2d 144,146 (Utah 1987) ("principles of equity apply wherever necessary to prevent injustice"). 
The conditions for application of laches are satisfied in this case. For the reasons 
demonstrated under the statute of limitations analysis, above, plaintiffs 26-year delay in 
bringing this action is unreasonable. She knew in 1967 that her child had allegedly been taken 
for adoption against her will; she had a defendant; and she had a legal theory of duress. Yet, 
plaintiff delayed in filing this action until 1993. It makes no difference that plaintiff did not 
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discover an alternative legal theory until 1990. Plaintiff clearly "slumbered on her rights." As a 
result of plaintiff s delay, defendants are prejudiced by the difficulties of proof caused by the 
long passage of time. The availability, quantity, and quality of evidence are naturally and 
unavoidably impaired. Defendants would certainly be disadvantaged by having to defend this 
action with incomplete information to rebut plaintiffs claims. Therefore, the laches bar must be 
applied to prevent injustice. 
B. Plaintiff Has Failed to State A Claim For Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress,, 
Plaintiff alleges negligence, constructive fraud, breach of contract, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress in obtaining her adoption consent, with the alleged injury being 
the loss of her son. (Amended Complaint, fflj 41-43, 50-51, 56, 60-62.) Plaintiff alleges no 
personal injury or economic loss. She seeks only damages for the "heartache" or emotional 
distress resulting from the loss of her child. However, established Utah law precludes recovery 
of damages for emotional distress under any of the first three legal theories. Moreover, plaintiff 
has failed to establish any right to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Utah law strictly limits recovery of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Such damages may be recovered only when they result from an accompanying physical injury, or 
when the claimant is within the "zone of danger" when witnessing physical injury to others. See, 
e.g., Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 785 (Utah 1988); Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg Med. Center, 
791 P.2d 193, 200-01 (Utah 1990); Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236 (Utah 1992). In 
this case, plaintiff does not allege that she was injured physically or was within the zone of 
danger from another's injury. Therefore, plaintiffs negligence claim must fail as a matter of law 
because she has alleged no compensable injury. 
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Neither can damages for emotional distress be recovered under theories of constructive 
fraud or breach of contract. In Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62, 68 (Utah 
App. 1992), this Court explained that both these theories are designed to protect economic 
interests and restore pecuniary loss, not to recompense vague emotional injury: 
[DJeceit is an economic, not a dignitary tort, and resembles, in the interest it seeks 
to protect, a contract claim more than a tort claim. For this reason, though strong 
men may cry at the loss of money, separate recovery for mental anguish is 
usually denied in deceit cases, just as it is denied in contract cases, simply 
because emotional distress, though resulting naturally enough from many frauds, 
is not one of the interests the law ordinarily seeks to protect in deceit cases. 
[Quoting D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies, § 9.2 at 602 (1973), emp. 
added. 
Because fraud is an economic tort, "the better reasoned approach is to disallow recovery of 
emotional distress damages in a fraud action." Turner, supra, at 68. See also Restatement (2d) 
of Contracts § 353 (denying emotional distress damages for breach of contract because they are 
difficult to verify and measure in the absence of physical injury). Accordingly, plaintiffs 
constructive fraud and contract claims must also be denied, as a matter of law, because the 
requested relief cannot be granted. 
Finally, plaintiff cannot recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
because the act of taking plaintiffs adoption consent does not constitute "outrageous conduct," as 
required by Utah law. For example, the leading case of Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 347 
(Utah 1961), limited recovery to situations in which the defendant's "actions are of such a nature 
as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality." See Restatement (2d) of Torts § 46 (the conduct at issue 
must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible 
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bounds of decency;
 regarcieci a s c 
community"). This standard has been satisfied only in the few cases involving a course of 
conduct calculated to harass the victim over a period of time. See Samms, supra, and Retherford 
single act alleged to be in violation of an agreement, such as a wrongful discharge from 
employment or even lying to an employee.,. See Sperber v. Galigher Ash i ' o 74 ) P.2d 1025, 
1028 (Utah 1987); Robertson v. Utah Fuel Co., 889 P.2d 1382, 1388-89 (Utah App. 1995); 
Dubois v. Grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073, 1078 (Utah App. 1994). Accordingly, the Agency's 
providing a home for her child, plainly does not rise to the level of "outrageous" conduct required 
for recovery under intentional infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, that determination can 
be made as a matter of law. See Sperber, supra, at 1028-29; and Robertson, supra, at 1388-89 
(both denying the claim on summary judgment) Therefore, defendants are entitled to summary 
judgmti 
In summary, this Court should alternatively affirm the district court on the grounds of 
laches and unavailability of damages for emotional distress.5 
"The proper remedy for entry into a contract while incapacitated is, of course, to disaffirm the contract upon 
regaining capacity and sue for rescission of the contract. If not timely disaffirmed, the voidable contract is deemed 
ratified, and subsequent relief may be barred by laches or equitable estoppel. See, e.g., Smith v. Williamson, 30 P. 753, 
754 (Utah 1892) (enforcing voidable contract made while intoxicated because it was ratified upon becoming sober); 
Perry v. Woodall, 438 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1968) (party seeking to rescind contract based on deception must act 
promptly or be bound by the contract); 41 Am fur, 2d Incompetent Persons §§ 66y 80-81, 85, 87 (1995 Interim Siipp,). 
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POINT III: THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT. 
Prior to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff moved to file a second 
amended complaint. The stated purposes of the amendment were to insert the names of Doe 
defendants, present a more clear statement of plaintiff s case, and to provide defendants better 
notice of the claims in order to assist them "to respond better." (App. Br. 46; R. 140.) 
Defendants opposed the amendment on the grounds that the named Doe defendants had nothing 
to do with plaintiffs claims; the amendment alleged no new facts or claims; and, instead of 
clarifying plaintiffs claims, the amendment would unduly complicate them. (R. 148-54.) 
Moreover, defendants never requested an amendment and did not consider one necessary for 
their benefit. The district court agreed with defendants, noting that "[n]othing of substance is 
added by the proposed amendment" and properly held that "it should be denied as 6fruitless.'" (R. 
197, Add. 4-6.) 
After a responsive pleading has been filed, a complaint may be amended only with leave 
of court, and only "when justice so requires." Rule 15(a), Utah R. Civ. P. Permission to amend 
is discretionary with the district court, and a reviewing court may not disturb the district court's 
ruling absent "a clear abuse of discretion." Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1190 
(Utah App. 1987); see also Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025,1028 (Utah App. 
1993). Moreover, leave to amend should be denied when the proposed amendment adds nothing 
of substance to the case and is therefore fruitless, legally insufficient, or futile. See, e.g., Jensen 
v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 292 (Utah 1992); Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 
1046 (Utah App. 1994). 
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amended her complaint once, following defendants' motion to dismiss, tn .tdd new allegations 
and claims. (R 113.) Both the original complaint and the amended complaint named as 
defendants tbt \ren id V * Ynnoration of the Presiding Bish ; ^ The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints. The proposed second amended complaint merely added as 
defendants i
 ( .< • . > 
that had no direct involvement in plaintiff s adoption. (R. 165.) I he proposed second amended 
complaint contained no new factual allegations or claims, and no specific allegations against the 
proposedadditi f^ruLr . / • •',.*-..' * *, . iu :-Jr-* ' » 
the case and served no useful purpose. Even now, plaintiff fails to explain how the granting of 
summary judgment. The district court would have reached the same result. Because the 
proposed second amended complaint served no purpose and would have been subject to all of the 
and Andalex, supra; Dupler v Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (1960) (affirming denial 
of motion to amend complaint because amendment presented no new theory or claim and 
effected no substantial change in the issues). 
POINT IV: THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO STRIKE THE 
FIRST CARLING AFFIDAVIT, WHICH PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL 
OBTAINED THROUGH INAPPROPRIATE EX PARTE CONTACT 
WITH DEFENDANT CARLINGo 
In response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff filed the first 
Affidavit of Gh 
in 1967. (R<, 306,) The affidavit was obtained through an ex parte meeting between defendant 
Carling and plaintiffs counsel. (Affidavit of Richard G. Hackwell, R. 347.) Defendants filed a 
motion for protective order and sanctions, including the striking of the first Carling Affidavit, on 
the grounds that it was procured through a violation of rules of professional conduct. (R. 311, 
314,316,318.) In support of their motion, defendants attached a second Affidavit of Gladys G. 
Carling, affirming that she was represented by counsel for defendants. (R. 324, fflf 2-3.) 
Defendants' motion for protective order and sanctions was to be heard at the same time as their 
motion for summary judgment. However, after granting defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, the district court ruled that the separate motion for protective order and sanctions was 
"moot." (R. 363, 368, 370.) This Court, while affirming the summary judgment, should address 
the merits of this cross-appeal, not only to correct the record by striking the first Carling 
affidavit, but to communicate the impropriety of the conduct by which it was obtained, for 
guidance of counsel in this case as well as other counsel in future cases. 
Review of plaintiff s counsel's ex parte contact with defendant Carling should not be 
denied on grounds of mootness. An issue is "moot" only when the requested judicial relief 
cannot affect the rights of the parties. E.g., Burkett v. Schwendiman, 111 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 
1989). The judicial relief of striking the first Carling affidavit could affect the rights of the 
parties if further proceedings are required, either on further appeal or remand. In addition, a 
further sanction, such as payment of costs and attorney fees, may be necessary to adequately 
communicate the impropriety of the conduct at issue to opposing counsel and other members of 
the bar in this state. Accordingly, defendants hereby request such further relief, which this Court 
is authorized to grant. See Rule 40, Utah R. App. P. This monetary relief certainly will affect 
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issue is considered moot, this Court should still review the conduct at issue because it affects 
important interests of the public and the bar, is likely to recur if not corrected, and, as it involves 
disc * j( •• ' * * * • ' ' ' '• 'HYWW i . r • , 
Burkett, supra, at 44; Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981) ("[t]he law provides no 
exemption j a < \ 
Proceeding to the merits of the issue, the ex parte contact of plaintiff s counsel with 
Gladys Carling, a represented adverse party, violated the express prohibition of Rule 4.2, Utah R. 
ofProf • 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject 
of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is 
authorized by law to do so. [Add. 12.] 
Gladys Carling is a "Doe" defendant in this action. She is the Agency social worker who acted 
on behalf of the Agency in taking plaintiffs adoption consent; moreover, that single act is 
alleged as the only factual and legal basis for Agency liability. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that 
"Does 1 through 10 are agents or employees" of the Agency (Amend. Comp., 14), and that an 
Vinplos n1" ol lii' AJJCIH \ ohl mini phi 3 
Carling in alleging that "Defendants saw plaintiffs physical condition" and violated various 
rights and a obtaining plaintn ..adoption (U., 111L,! I I I .'ill. ") I. 6U.) 
Of course, only Carling "saw" plaintiff and obtained her consent. Furthermore, Carling verified 
in her second affidavit that she met with defendants' counsel on August 2,1995, to discuss 
defense of the cast1 <iiirf llwi l^if is ivphMiilnl in illliii u I inn In ilrlrnse counsel |I>! LIS,) 
Accordingly, the ex parte meeting of plaintiff s counsel with Carling on April 8, 1996 (R. 347) 
violated the express terms of Rule 4.2. See, e.g., State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397 (Utah App. 1990) 
(applying the rule in a criminal action).6 
Gladys Carling should also be considered a "party" to this action as a former Agency 
employee whose conduct is the subject of this litigation. As such, plaintiffs counsel's ex parte 
contact still violated Rule 4.2, as explained in the official comment to the rule: 
In the case of an organization,... this Rule prohibits communications by a 
lawyer for one party concerning the matter in representation with persons having a 
managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization, and with any other person 
whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the 
organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may 
constitute an admission on the part of the organization. [Add. 13, emp. added.] 
The entire focus of this action is to impute Carting's conduct, in taking plaintiffs adoption 
consent, to the Agency for the purpose of holding the Agency liable in damages for that conduct. 
In addition, plaintiff relies on Carting's statement, that "plaintiff was sedated" when she signed 
the consent, as an admission by the Agency that plaintiff was incapacitated. (App. Br. 11, 20, 
36-37.) Given the central focus on Carting's conduct and statements as the specific and sole 
grounds for alleged Agency liability, Carling should be considered a "party" for purposes of Rule 
4.2, precluding ex parte contact by plaintiffs counsel. 
Several cases have interpreted Rule 4.2 to prohibit ex parte contact with former 
employees whose conduct is the subject of the litigation. For example, in Public Service Elec. 
and Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Services, 745 F. Supp. 1037 (D.N.J. 1990), the 
Given that Carling had previously discussed defense of the case with defense counsel, the subsequent meeting 
with plaintiffs counsel may also have violated Carting's legal right to the attorney-client privilege, as further 
prohibited by Rule 4.4, governing respect for the legal rights of third persons. See ABA Formal Op. 91-359, "Contact 
With Former Employee of Adverse Corporate Party" (1991). 
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establish wrongful denial of insurance coverage. The court examined Rule 4.2 and recognized 
that its purpose is to prevent the professionally trained lawyer from extracting damaging 
concessions from the unshielded h\itii.ini in i .if III i"1"1 I lot n a n ,i if on unit' employee"'*• i Is or 
statements can be imputed to the employer to the same degree as those of a current employee. 
/J" ill III III i mi i d u i g l ) , I hi: i mill 1) 'hi illliiil former e m p l o y e e s w h o s e acts are imputab le to the 
employer "cannot be the subject of informal ex parte investigative fact finding." Id. at 1042. 
Rather, plaintiffs counsel should follow the deposition process as "the best method of 
Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 253 (D. Kan. 1988) (denying ex parte interviews 
^ j k £QTmCT e m p i 0 y e e s IA( h 0 m a j i i a v e b e e n involved in the allegedly unlawful conduct and 
whose actions could be imputed to the defendant for purposes of civil liability); Amarin Plastics, 
Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36, 40 (D. Mass. 1987) (prohibition on ex parte contact 
applin ". mo I in'on in n u p l o u T s uhose i uinlii i r, ill ,un| i ation); I Jni\ ei sity Pi liei its, 
Inc. v. Kligman, 737 F. Supp. 325, 328-29 (D. Pa. 1990) (sanction for improper ex parte contact 
was exclusion from the record of the information obtained). 
In summary, the purpose of Rule 4.2 is manifest in this case, as plaintiffs counsel 
extracted from Gladys Carling the admission that "plaintiff was sedated" when she signed the 
consent Ill1"1 illll I If defense i ouiiisrl had been iiiesenl lot i los.s-rsamination < iiilinj.1 timid 
have clarified, as she did in her second affidavit, that, even if plaintiff was sedated, she still had 
sufficient mental capacity to know what she was doing, (R 326 Because plaintiff seeks to 
impute Carling's acts and statements to the Agency for the purpose of holding the Agency liable, 
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and because Carling's conduct is the subject of this litigation, she should be considered a "party" 
for purposes of Rule 4.2. Therefore, opposing counsel's ex parte contact was improper, and an 
appropriate sanction should be imposed, including striking of the first Carling affidavit and 
payment of costs and attorney fees incurred in obtaining this relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the district court's order of summary 
judgment in favor of defendants. In addition, this Court should review counsel's ex parte contact 
with Gladys Carling, rule the contact improper, and impose a sanction striking the affidavit 
thereby obtained and awarding costs and reasonable attorney fees to defendants. 
Respectfully submitted this J _ day of February, 1997. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
David M. McConkie 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees/ 
Cross-Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS this i L d a y of February, 1997, in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid to the foil * 
Richard G. Hackwell 
Mclntyre Building, 8th Floor 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1534 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
^ • '^&£2e+v. 
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TJjfrd Judicial District 
David M. McConkie (A2154) 
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFSTEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; THE CORPORATION OF 
THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a Utah 
corporation, and DOES 1-10, 
ORDER 
Case No. 930902822PI 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
I r, 
Sanctions, and to Quash Subpoena came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Kenneth 
Rigtrup M. 
McConkie; plaintiff was represented by Richard G. Hackwell. The Court, having considered the 
written memoranu guments : parties, " 
1. The statute of limitations and statute of repose in the Health Care Malpractice Act, 
U.CA. § 78-14-4(1), do not apply because the taking of plaintiffs adoption consent does not 
constitute provision of medical care to the plaintiff. 
2. Plaintiffs tort claims are barred by the statute of limitations in U.CA. § 78-12-
25(3), and plaintiffs contract claim is barred by the statute of limitations in U.CA. § 78-12-23(2). 
3. Plaintiff knew of her injury, the loss of her child, upon leaving the hospital in 1967, 
and her cause of action accrued at that time. 
4. The administration of thorazine was reasonably discoverable by plaintiff within the 
limitations period following her release from the hospital, but plaintiff failed to take reasonable 
steps to discover the cause of her alleged incapacity. 
5. Plaintiff was on notice to inquire about the circumstances surrounding the taking 
of her consent because, as she alleged, "not a day has passed since January, 1967, that plaintiff 
has not felt the deep heartache and void of the loss of her child and the loss of the joys of 
motherhood." 
6. Plaintiffs action is time-barred under any applicable statute of limitations, and her 
Amended Complaint is accordingly dismissed with prejudice. 
7. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
8. With the granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants' separate 
Motion for Protective Order, Sanctions, and to Quash Subpoena is rendered moot. 
-2-
OTO£ 
DATED this J L day o ^ & ^ , 1996. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be n lai led the • toi egc -. ft- • ;; -.s^'dav c e, 
1996, in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Richard G. Hackwell 
Mclntyre Building, 8th Floor 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1534 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
[Jhvnu, /s&oi^ 
FIUO DISTRICT CWJR: 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 2 0 1996 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
r>«outvClerW 
HANCY 6. SAFSTEN, 
Plaintiff, 
MS. 
XDS SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., a 
Utah corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY - RULE 4-501 
RULING 
CASE NO. 930902822 
While plaintiff's proposed "Second Amended Complaint" adds 
additional named parties, it alleges no actionable misconduct on 
the part of such additional parties. Also, the "Second Amended 
Complaint11 alleges that the additional defendants "supervised and 
established policy," but it does not identify any specific policies 
or acts of supervision. 
Nothing of substance is added by the proposed amendment, and 
it should be denied as "fruitless." Plaintiff's Motion for 
Permission to File Second Amended Complaint is denied. 
Counsel for defendants shall submit an appropriate Order 
hereon. ^^ 
Dated this ZP day of February, 1996. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE V^'^STOSS* 
David M. McConkie (A2154) 
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
3y. 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 6 1996 
^ O l l t v O o r W 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NANC SAFSTEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; THE CORPORATION OF 
THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS. *. Utah 
corporation, and DOES 1 1 , 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
-ase No. 930902822PI 
.dge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Plaintiffs Motion Permissk Second Amended Complaint came 
before the court for decision, without oral argument, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code of 
Judicial Administration. having considered opposing memoraiK 
arguments of the parties, entered a Ruling on February 20,1996 denying plaintiffs motion. 
Based on that Ruling, the Court now hereby orders that plaintiffs motion is 
denied for the reasons that the proposed amendment (1) alleges no actionable misconduct 
by the additional parties; (2) identifies no specific policies to be at issue; and (3) adds 
nothing of substance to the case. 
DATED this 2JQ ~ciay of March, 1996. 
JUJJ£^ 
istricO Court Judge () ^ X ^ S ^ " 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
J* 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed the foregoing ORDER this ( day 
of March, 1996, in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Richard G. Hackwell, Esq, 
Mclntyre Building, 8th Floor 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1534 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
K^nsyuju <(D (h-^TJU^^ 
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i) f a O / t c 
STATE OF 7t-Zc7u ) 
COUNTY OTUU:LC^. ) 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
, )"( A..->•»-<?• %.., SJ<y.i..<,L,t,^ , /J/tj^C J\A*-rt^'.^> I 
, 2^. t*s/ts being first duly sworn, depose and say. 
3 ~ am the unmarried mother of a certain W f ^ / c . child of 
the white race born ww .,.« «, .• lL*\ **fi?^^ ^ Coun* 
3* j««. T-fe,
 M ^ „,* i. 
19j^2t at Bald rMlrf - conceived and born nil ,.(^1^k 6* 
have been in oole custody and control of said-child since 
the birth of said child, unable to give said child a proper name. 
That I hereby Covenant
 a 
D
' F» !1: " ,, '  .1 ' " f 1 '1 ' !: General Board Associationt Hereinafter called 
1JM "Licensed Agency," will accept said child for placement or adoption, that I 
shall never interfere r attemp^ any manner * « Id child, or to 
ascertain the whereabout? 
':aoever9 
htreby consent that the Licensed Agency, may make provisions 
lor the mtdloal of laid child, give consent for operations, make other 
deoiaions 
a E i d c h i W | 
htreby release all of my right, title and interest 
aald child and to tht earnings of laid child and also 
the cuitody m d aont*> nereby 
authorize and raqueit said Licensed Agency t* a. discretion, to place said 
child in a home for adoption, 
hereby release said child. ~ ~ r r -•:•*•.••
 flf»<** 
c m r p f i i ! I j
 iver again olaim . * . 
cr interest in and -aid child «.- • - service \* arnings 
child or to the custody or contro <\* 
EXHIBIT A 
0 
6. That said Licensed Agency may place said child with any person 
or persons of good moral character who may be able to furnish said minor child 
vith a proper name, home and care, and that said person or persons may adopt 
said child to the end that it may have a home, name and proper care, and that I 
hereby consent and agree that the question of fitness of the person or persons 
who shall adopt said child and who is or are to have the care, custody and 
control of said child shall be left exclusively to the judgement of 6aid 
Licensed Agency, and the Judge of the Court before whom the adoption proceedings 
may be held. 
7. That I hereby waive notice of any and all legal proceedings which % 
may be held in courts of the State of Utah, or elsewhere, for the purpose of 
determination of the release and the adoption of said child or any thereof. 
I further state that I have carefully read the foregoing release and 
know of the contents thereof and sign the same as my own free act and deed and 
make and execute the same without any threat or promise. 
Witness my hand this //£ day of V h a ^ ^ ^ t ^ r ^ , 1$£ 71 at 
(Jl4L*[t ,^i / , County of // ^ O ^ / c ^ ^ , State of UUft 
IftyhSAJs ^\oyuUn^^^ 
MOtHER A 
AKA>3 
STATE OF V £<£'/! ) 
COUNTY U&^tUi/A-iS ) 
On the //> day of M ^ ^ C J ^ - I M , 19^ 9, personally 
appeared before me, /^w^<££.t
 /<!?^t^<»/>t/'fy » AKA \j-iu*i?t-~ Xyt^-**<*-*—* 
the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that she 
executed the same. 
My commission expires: 
rv. C A? 0/D Residencei A-n-^/ C^Jf ^<"^S &/&•*( 
may be held in courts of the State of Utah, or elsewhere, for the purpose of 
determination of the release and the adoption of said child or any thereof. 
I further state that I have carefully read the foregoing release and 
know of the contents thereof and sign the same as my own free act and deed and 
make and execute the same without any threat or promise. 
Witness my hand this //£ day of V 1 * 2 ^ ^ ^ * ^ ^
 t 19£ 7. at witness my nanu uus / n uciy UL \ j<^7^^t^^.^ 
/$~4' - • • County ° f Q 'O^U-i u6><. . , State of 
W ^ e Y > ^dAAon/^V^ 
AKA 
STATE Of V £<£'/£ ) 
*Jj ^ 8 S 
COUNTY O E ^ / ^ U . - L ^ ) 
On the //> day of \J ^^u* r^t.** , 19^9, personally 
appeared before me, 7^v~>^^i /Q.<^>^*£.ru*>ts . AKA O-rt^,/^ )'Ao>t^^u/ 
the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that she 
executed the same. /} 
My commission expires: /Jstf-^i^ty^s /<Y ^/^^A^-r 
Residence: 
-C-2\£" 
r%^er 
Vbtil2K 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-25 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
GJ.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions *=» 
§ 33 et seq. 58(2). 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instru-
ment in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchan-
dise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an open 
account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at 
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last 
payment is received; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections 
of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the 
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
History: L- 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp„ 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14; 1996, 
ch. 79, S 110. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective April 29,1996, in the introduc-
tory paragraph, substituted "An action may be 
brought within" for "Within"; deleted "An ac-
tion" at the beginning of Subsections (1) and (3); 
and made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Antitrust Act actions, 
§ 76-10-925. 
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, 
§ 78-15-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Assigned cause of action. 
Breach of fiduciary duty. 
Conflict of laws. 
Damage of private property for public use. 
Discovery rule. 
Discovery rule. 
Divorce actions. 
Equitable actions. 
Excessive freight charges. 
Extension of period. 
Federal civil rights actions. 
Indemnity or guaranty bond. 
Judgment lien. 
Land contract 
Malpractice. 
Mortgages. 
Negligent employment 
Nuisances. 
Open account 
Oral contract 
Oral modification of written contract. 
Other claims for relief. 
— Federal claim. 
— Negligence. 
— Promissory estoppel. 
Paternity action. 
Overpayment. 
Personal injuries. 
Pleading and proof. 
Product liability. 
Purpose of section. 
Quieting title. 
Recovery of payments under note. 
Reformation of instrument 
Relation back of complaints. 
Relief not otherwise provided for. 
Restraining actions. 
Running of statute. 
— Payment of settlement obligation. 
Stockholder's duty to pay taxes. 
Taking for public use. 
Tax paid under protest 
Tolling. 
— Class actions. 
Torts. 
Trustees. 
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-23 
violate the automatic stay provisions of the 
federal bankruptcy code, because a renewal is 
not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the 
original judgment. Barber v. Emporium Part-
nership, 800 R2d 795 (Utah 1990). 
Stipulations. 
Parties to contract may stipulate for period of 
limitations shorter than that fixed by statute of 
limitations. Clark v. Lund, 55 Utah 284,184 P. 
821 (1919). 
Support or maintenance. 
The eight-year statute of limitations applies 
to past due unpaid installments for alimony or 
support of minor children, and therefore execu-
tion may issue only for the arrearages accumu-
lated within a period of eight years. Seeley v. 
Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975). 
A Utah action brought in 1978 to enforce a 
1975 Ohio action for support arrearages, which 
also included a 1967 Ohio action for support 
arrearages, was timely filed under this section. 
Logan v. Schneider, 609 P.2d 943 (Utah 1980). 
Wife could apply her time-barred claim for 
child support arrearages to offset her husband's 
hen on the marital home, and then affirma-
Am. Jar. 2d. — 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and 
Separation §§ 1073,1074; 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judg-
ments § 897 et seq. 
C-J.S. - 27C C.J.S Divorce §§ 684 to 693; 50 
C.J.S. Judgments §§ 854, 871; 67AC.J.S. Par-
ent and Child §§ 73 to 89. 
AXJL — Statute of limitations: effect of 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, $ 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-23; L. 1984, ch. 16, § 2; 1996, 
ch. 79, { 109; 1996, ch. 210, 8 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment by ch. 79, effective April 29,1996, in the 
introductory paragraph, substituted "An action 
may be brought within* for "Within*; deleted 
"An action" at the beginning of Subsections (1) 
to (3); and in Subsections (1) and (2), substi-
tuted a semicolon for a period. 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 210, effective 
tively assert her claim for past due support that 
had accrued within the limitations period. 
Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). 
Tolling. 
In action by administrator, indebtedness cre-
ated by check was held to be barred, and 
statute was not tolled by unauthorized acts of 
plaintiff. Bingham v. Walker Bros., Bankers, 75 
Utah 149, 283 P. 1055 (1929). 
Action to renew a judgment brought more 
than eight years after the date of entry of the 
original judgment was barred by this section 
even though defendant had signed a written 
agreement acknowledging the obligation and 
had made some payments thereon less than 
eight years before commencement of the action. 
The common-law rule which tolled the limita-
tion period in case of acknowledgment or part 
payment is limited by § 78-12-44 so that it now 
applies only to contract actions. Yergensen v. 
Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d 696 (1965). 
Cited in Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
delay in appointing administrator or other rep-
resentative on cause of action accruing at or 
after death of person in whose favor it would 
have accrued, 28 A.L.R.3d 1141. 
Key Numbers. — Divorce ^* 311; Judgment 
«= 910,934; Parent and Child «=» 3.3(4), 3.4(2). 
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection (3) 
regarding distribution of criminal proceeds to 
victims. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act, 
statute of limitations, § 78-15-3. 
Promise to pay extends period, § 78-12-44. 
Three-year limitation period for action on 
written insurance contract, § 31A-21-313. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-12-23. Within six years — Mesne profits of real prop-
erty — Instrument in writing. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(1) for the mesne profits of real property; 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instru-
ment in writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
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Rule 4.1 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 1156 
participant in a proceeding before a ... legisla- shall disclose ... [ulnless privileged or irrele-
tive body... should never be participated in . . . vant, the identity of the clients he represents 
by lawyers." DR 7-106(B)(l) provided that "[i]n and of the persons who employed him.M 
presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer 
Transactions with Persons Other Than 
Clients 
Rule 4.1. Truthfulness in Statements to Others. 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(a) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or 
(b) Fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is 
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, 
unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6. 
COMMENT 
Misrepresentation 
A lawyer is required to be truthful when 
dealing with others on a client's behalf, but 
generally has no affirmative duty to inform an 
opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepre-
sentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates 
or affirms a statement of another person that 
the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations 
can also occur by failure to act. 
Statements of Fact 
This rule refers to statements of fact. 
Whether a particular statement should be re-
garded as one of fact can depend on circum-
stances. Under generally accepted conventions 
in negotiation, certain types of statements or-
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment added the last two sentences. 
This Rule does not prohibit communication 
with a party, or an employee or agent of a 
party, concerning matters outside the repre-
sentation. For example, the existence of a con-
troversy between a government agency and a 
private party, or between two organizations, 
does not prohibit a lawyer for either from com-
municating with nonlawyer representatives of 
dinarily are not taken as statements of mate-
rial fact. Estimates of price or value placed on 
the subject of a transaction and a party's inten-
tions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim 
are in this category, and so is the existence of 
an undisclosed principal except where nondis-
closure of the principal would constitute fraud. 
Fraud by Client 
Paragraph (b) recognizes that substantive 
law may require a lawyer to disclose certain 
information to avoid being deemed to have as-
sisted the client's crime or fraud. The require-
ment of disclosure created by this paragraph is, 
however, subject to the obhgations created by 
Rule 1.6. 
the other regarding a separate matter. Also, 
parties to a matter may communicate directly 
with each other and a lawyer having indepen-
dent justification for communicating with the 
other party is permitted to do so. For purposes 
of this rule, litigation with a government party 
includes any adversarial judicial or adminis-
trative proceeding. The requirement of disclo-
CODE COMPARISON 
Paragraph (a) is substantially similar to DR With regard to paragraph (b), DR 
7-102(A)(5), which stated that a[i]n his repre- 7-102(A)(3) provided that a lawyer shall not 
sentation of a client, a lawyer shall not ... *[c]onceal or knowingly fail to disclose that 
[klnowingly make a false statement of law or which he is required by law to reveal." 
fact" 
Rule 4.2. Communication with Person Represented by 
Counsel. 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject 
of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by 
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other 
lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. This rule does not apply to communi-
cations with government parties unless litigation about the subject of the 
representation is pending or imminent. Communications with elected officials 
are permissible when litigation is pending or imminent after disclosure of the 
representation to the official. 
(Amended effective April 1, 1996.) 
COMMENT 
1157 RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.4 
sure of the representation is satisfied by dis- matter may be imputed to the organization for 
closing the identity of the client, the subject purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose 
matter of the representation, and the fact that statement may constitute an admission on the 
the lawyer is acting in a representative capac- part of the organization. If an agent or em-
ity. ployee of the organization is represented in the 
In the case of an organization, including a matter by his or her own counsel, the consent 
governmental organization when litigation is by that counsel to a communication will be suf-
pending or imminent, this Rule prohibits com- ficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 
munications by a lawyer for one party concern- 3.4(f). 
ing the matter in representation with persons This Rule also covers any person, whether or 
having a managerial responsibility on behalf not a party to a formal proceeding, who is rep-
of the organization, and with any other person resented by counsel concerning the matter in 
whose act or omission in connection with that question. 
CODE COMPARISON 
This Rule is substantially identical to DR 
7-104(A)(l). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Ez parte contact with former employees, nizational party that is represented by counsel. 
Under the federal district court's rules of Shearson Lehman Bros. v. Wasatch Bank, 139 
practice, this rule does not prohibit ex parte F.R.D. 412 CD. Utah 1991). 
contact with the former employees of an orga-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Public Service Elec- of Rule 4.2 and Ex Parte Contacts With For-
trie & Gas Co. v. Associated Electric & Gas mer Employees, 1991 Utah L. Rev. 647. 
Insurance Services, Ltd.: An Expansive View 
Rule 4.3. Dealing with Unrepresented Person. 
(a) During the course of a lawyer's representation of a client, the lawyer 
shall not give advice to an unrepresented person other than the advice to 
obtain counsel. 
(b) In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by 
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. 
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented 
person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make 
reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. 
COMMENT 
An unrepresented person, particularly one loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the 
not experienced in dealing with legal matters, law even when the lawyer represents a client 
might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in 
CODE COMPARISON 
There was no direct counterpart to this Rule is not represented by a lawyer, other than the 
in the Code. DR 7-104(A)(2) provided that a advice to secure counsel ..." 
lawyer shall not "[g]ive advice to a person who 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Shearson Lehman Bros. v. Wasatch 
Bank, 139 F.R.D. 412 (D. Utah 1991). 
Rule 4.4. Respect for Rights of Third Persons* 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substan-
tial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use 
methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person 
